Joachim Bitterlich: ‘We had no clear roadmap for reunification’

Project 1989

To gain a clearer sense of our temporal contours, the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics is going back to the previous turning point of 1989. Francis Fukuyama famously asserted that we were experiencing not just the end of the Cold War, but the end of History as such. While it is easy to question such collective illusions today, it is another challenge to undo them. Is it possible to experience the ‘Return of History’ as an opportunity, a trigger to redefine our relations with the rest of the world and to reposition ourselves in time, as Europeans? 

In collaboration with the Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA), BIG is publishing a series of witness interviews about this historic moment in time, the ‘Project 1989’. It is supported by the European Cultural Foundation.

Joachim Bitterlich (b. 1948) is a German diplomat and foreign policy expert. In 1989, he served as foreign and security policy advisor to Chancellor Helmut Kohl. During the historic months leading to and following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Bitterlich played a crucial, behind-the-scenes role in shaping West Germany’s strategic response. He was deeply involved in managing diplomatic communications with key partners including France, NATO allies and the Soviet Union. 

LvM: Where were you on the historic evening of 9 November 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell?

JB: My chancellor was in Warsaw. I had stayed in Bonn. I was the advisor on European affairs. At the time, there were no mobile phones, no internet – nothing. His closest advisor and spokesperson tried every number we had, going through the protocol office, through the German embassy in Poland. But there was a reception underway, and no one was there to answer. Eventually, we managed to reach the chancellor's spokesperson. He finally got the chancellor on the phone and said, ‘The Wall is open!’ The chancellor replied, ‘What’s going on?’

LvM: He didn’t believe it at first?

JB: No, not initially. He even asked, ‘Are you celebrating? What’s going on?’ We told him, ‘We’re watching it live on TV. The Wall is open. People are crossing freely to the West.’ We explained, ‘Mr. Chancellor, you must return to Germany immediately. The SPD in Berlin is organizing a major rally with the city mayor and others to celebrate their role in the Wall’s opening, and the local CDU is organizing a counter-meeting. You need to stop this; you must show the unity of the nation.’ Political manoeuvring in the midst of historical events. It was more than just politics. The chancellor faced the difficulty of explaining why he had to interrupt, but not cancel, his visit to Poland. There was a scheduled visit to Auschwitz and to Silesia, a very sensitive subject. Additionally, he couldn’t simply fly from Warsaw to Berlin directly. Allied regulations at the time allowed flights to Berlin only through specific corridors. He needed a special arrangement, which the American ambassador resolved by offering his plane.

LvM: So, he was able to circumvent the airspace restrictions?

JB: Yes, he flew via the Baltic Sea to Hamburg first, then on to Berlin. Once there, he attended the rally, where he faced a mixed reception – some even booed him. It was chaotic, to say the least. He had to assure Poland and the Soviet Union that this was not an action against them. Don’t forget, both Germanies had separately recognized the post-war borders long before.

The situation was uncertain, and we were navigating in the fog. This led to the famous Ten-Point Plan presented on 28 November in the German Bundestag, three weeks after the Wall came down. It was drafted by a small working group within the administration. Diplomats and non-diplomats, under the chairmanship of Horst Teltschik, collaborated on the plan, which laid out the possibility of reunification through confederal structures as a transitional step.

LvM: Was there not concern that this confederal proposal might play into Soviet interests, to maintain East Germany?

JB: That question has often been raised. Some have argued it was a trap. But at the time, we had no clear roadmap for reunification. We didn’t know if the Soviets, the French or the British would agree. Only the US, under Bush, showed cautious support. We used ‘confederative structures’ as an intermediate step. Chancellor Kohl wasn’t entirely confident, but he saw the fall of the Wall as a chance to push for unification. The details weren’t fixed; we were figuring out the essentials as we went. For example, we lacked a comprehensive understanding of the GDR’s reality – socially, economically, environmentally. We learned over time, starting in January [1990], how dire things were in the GDR. Franz Josef Strauss had even facilitated loans to keep the regime afloat. Socially, the GDR had peculiarities, like a universal childcare system that meant children rarely spent time with their parents. On the medical front, they had rural health centres that were surprisingly advanced. Yet, during reunification, we dismantled many of these systems, causing unintended damage.

LvM: The industrial collapse must have been challenging as well.

JB: Absolutely. Industries in the GDR lost their markets in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Meanwhile, the Soviets were deeply concerned about unrest spreading through their satellite states. At one point, in November, the Russians were worried, so they called us: ‘Our troops are on alert, our secret services are telling us to intervene as soon as possible.’ Horst Teltschik told them, ‘No, no, no, it’s completely peaceful. These are people who simply want freedom, that’s all.’ There was no armed intervention from the West, neither by NATO nor by anyone else. Absolutely nothing.

LvM: I’m interested in how the interplay between Mitterrand and Kohl unfolded at that time.

JB: The French were pursuing their own strategic aims. Their ideas, while advanced, came with a French price – economically and financially. They wanted the Germans to finally open up financially to cover Europe’s needs. The French had what I would call pre-EMU ideas about deepening economic and financial integration, but their ideas were incompatible with the German approach. The French were, in a sense, caught in an illusion. Then, suddenly, the border opened. What to do about that? Mitterrand, just weeks before, had taken the stage. On 3 November, we had the Franco-German summit in Bonn. During the press conference, journalists naturally asked Mitterrand about the protests and the East Germans’ possible demands for reunification. Mitterrand stuck to general lines, saying, ‘Well, Germany may proceed with reunification, provided two conditions are met: first, it must reflect the will of both peoples; and second, it must align with the European order that has been established.’

LvM: Did Mitterrand's stance evolve after that?

JB: Yes, two months later, his position shifted. Kohl met with him privately, in early January. Three major points emerged from that meeting: one, full recognition of Germany’s borders; two, a commitment that a reunified Germany would remain within NATO, not become neutral; and three, Kohl’s agreement to continue supporting deeper European integration. Mitterrand formally agreed to this framework by 18 March [1990]. Meanwhile, under instructions, [his Europe advisor] Elisabeth Guigou and I had prepared a dual intergovernmental conference on EMU and political union.

LvM: But wasn’t the European Monetary Union (EMU) decided on at the Strasbourg summit in December 1989?

JB: Not exactly. The political union was discussed there. For EMU, there was a general agreement, but nothing concrete. Elisabeth Guigou represented France in the working group, but the model wasn’t finalized. For us, the hardest part was convincing the French to understand our conditions. If we were to proceed, it would be on our terms, not theirs, so with an independent central bank, etc. Ultimately, that approach prevailed. Jacques Delors played a crucial role, thanks to his 1988 report. With support from not just European idealists but the twelve central bank governors as well, with the difficulty for the German governor, Karl-Otto Pöhl, whose board was Franco-sceptical, of having to accept Delors’ report.

That’s why the negotiations became parallel developments: German reunification and Maastricht as two pillars of European construction. It was a whirlwind year – truly transformative. A true Zeitenwende. The post-war and Cold War orders were being dismantled, and we had to build a new framework.

LvM: When you look at it more abstractly, what were the key factors for success? Was it luck, American power, or something else?

JB: Part of it was luck – we had Bush in the US, who was prudent. At the European level, there was Delors. You’ll laugh at this: during the year leading up to German reunification, a working group was led by the deputy secretary-general of the Commission, who was Dutch, and not by the secretary-general, who was British. There were significant tensions, especially with Thatcher, who since February 1988 was increasingly being sidelined in European politics. Thatcher resisted German reunification until the very end, until July or even September 1990. The Dutch pushed for a conference of World War II victors before any German reunification – a proposal that was a non-starter.

LvM: And yet, Mitterrand had already accepted reunification by March?

JB: Yes, but it was carefully managed, with debates on how to ensure stability, particularly concerning NATO. Reunification was agreed upon with clear conditions: Germany would not leave NATO, and deeper European integration would continue. That balance was key to ensuring that reunification didn’t destabilize Europe.

LvM: Later, when we look at the sequence of events between 1989 and 1991, would you also say that Gorbachev was a stroke of luck?

JB: It's interesting because I met Gorbachev years later, when I was an ambassador in Madrid. I met him during an academic event, to which the Spanish had invited him. We had an intense conversation, with the help of an interpreter, about German reunification. My impression of him solidified quite early on. He was very clear: ‘I couldn't stop it. I failed.’ That was his difficulty – he acknowledged his failure. He blamed it on Western countries advancing eastwards, which fed into that persistent Russo-Soviet paranoia, fuelled by the Americans and others. For me, however, his failure was fundamentally an economic one.

When I looked into the economic reforms, it was clear they were completely misguided. They were not at all focused on what I consider essential economic transformation. The Poles, for instance, succeeded, and it wasn’t just luck.

LvM: And who exploited the cracks in Gorbachev's system?

JB: On one side, the Germans were helping but felt isolated, which was a serious concern. The French were absent, the British were indifferent, and without the Americans, things would have been far worse. The Americans had some peculiar ideas, though. Gorbachev was practically alone in handling the economic aspects. No one in Moscow had the necessary expertise to guide him. On the other hand, if we look at the reforms in the East, I’m convinced that when [Polish finance minister] Balcerowicz presented his reforms in 1991, they were revolutionary. And they worked, despite initial difficulties. For an ordinary Ukrainian crossing into Poland, Poland became the model – almost a miracle. It stood out as the example.

Meanwhile, Gorbachev's underlying failure persisted. Later, Kohl leveraged financial incentives as a tool. The Germans worked hard to ensure the peaceful withdrawal of thousands of Soviet soldiers, which went on until 1994. A transition period of four years. There was a remarkable event in 1994 in Berlin, the departure of the Allied troops. It featured an extraordinary speech by Mitterrand.

LvM: At the same event?

JB: Yes. But Mitterrand revised his speech multiple times en route from Paris to Berlin. It was rewritten entirely by hand. The final version was exceptional, almost de Gaulle-like, expressing his profound feelings toward the Germans. A heartfelt moment, and one of his last powerful public statements. … There was a public relations challenge afterwards. The Élysée didn’t have the recording of the speech. I got a frantic call asking if we had a recording of it, but I didn’t. They were in a bind because the speech was direct and emotional, something rare for Mitterrand.

LvM: Was Yeltsin present at the same event?

JB: No, the celebration with the Russians took place on 31 August, that of the Allies on 8 September 1994. Yeltsin was a difficult guest; he was taking heavy medication and his tolerance for alcohol was virtually non-existent. Yet he insisted on drinking to appear virile, which led to incidents.

LvM: But assistance continued after 1994?

JB: Yes, especially with Russia. Our goal was a relatively stable Russia, to prevent internal chaos. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was rushed and poorly executed. Ukraine was problematic from the start. For the Russians, Ukraine has never been a foreign country. This mindset persists. I even heard that Putin once suggested dividing Ukraine, offering the West the Catholic, conservative regions, while keeping the Orthodox East.

LvM: When did this happen?

JB: I’m not sure of the exact date, but it was during a private conversation between Putin and Tusk. I visited Ukraine frequently from 1993 onwards as part of stabilization programmes. Corruption was rampant; key figures were embroiled in scandals, which made reform incredibly challenging. As the Chancellor’s diplomatic advisor, I was focused on ensuring stability in both Russia and Ukraine while navigating other geopolitical concerns, like Turkey’s increasing interest in the region, which Moscow found alarming.

LvM: Regarding the ‘buffer zone’ of Ukraine, you’ve previously mentioned that we missed an opportunity to include Russia in a broader European order.

JB: Yes, and this discussion often references the historical misunderstandings surrounding the ‘Not one inch’ promise by James Baker. During Clinton’s presidency, there was still genuine engagement with Europe. He worked closely with Kohl and Yeltsin. Clinton’s approach was collaborative, consulting with European leaders before making major decisions.

LvM: A sharp contrast to later administrations.

JB: Exactly. By the late 1990s, discussions with Russia were becoming increasingly strained. The NATO-Russia Council, for example, never functioned as intended. Sergei Kislyak, then Russia’s NATO ambassador, once told me he felt isolated. ‘Seventeen against one,’ he said. He envisioned a European Security Council with representation from France, Germany, the UK, the US and Russia. I told him such a Council would have to include smaller nations as well. His reaction was dismissive, particularly towards Poland. That mindset hindered progress. At the time, our primary goal was to stabilize Russia and Ukraine. This wasn’t about Romania or Bulgaria – they were integrated into NATO and the EU. Ukraine, however, posed significant challenges. The real issue was Ukraine. From the start there was an agreement to disagree. It was clear that Ukraine was central to the broader European strategy.

LvM: And this led to the current situation – the largest war in Europe since 1945.

JB: Precisely. Back in 2019, I developed a framework for Ukraine’s neutrality and a ‘federal’ structure for the country. … It met with mixed reactions. The Russian representatives were interested, but Western leaders largely ignored it.

LvM: Why do you think that happened?

JB: A lack of political will and coordination. It was one of the last chances to prevent the current escalation.

Note on the interviewee:

Bitterlich, who had joined Chancellor Kohl’s staff in 1987 as Europe advisor, later served as chief diplomatic and security advisor (1993-98), and as Germany’s ambassador to NATO and to Spain. In 2021, he published Grenzgänger: Deutsche Interessen und Verantwortung in und für Europa: Erinnerungen eines Zeitzeugen (Ibidem).