‘Europe in Space’: Harmonizing the institutional orchestra

In discussions about ‘Europe in space’,¹ what is really meant? Day after day, the media, think tanks and political discourse imbue the concept with new ambitions from earth orbits to moon landings, even beyond, often without clarifying what concrete entities, policies, or actors are being referred to. This is particularly troubling because, far from resting on a monolithic set of organizations or coherent public policies, ‘Europe in space’ encompasses a patchwork of institutions – public and private; regional, national, and local – each pursuing distinct (or sometimes common) programmes and, more fundamentally, differing visions of the very purpose of space activities. In addition, throughout Europe, the approach to space policy varies significantly depending on the national cultural context from which space programmes emerged, ranging from scientific fascination and critical strategic concerns to the recognition of business opportunities.

Ultimately, the absence of clarity and precision in employing the convenient shorthand ‘Europe in space’ creates difficulties in public perception, which in turn complicate governance and accountability. This becomes an issue as Europe faces growing challenges from other spacefaring nations and regions, both in terms of its extra-atmospheric ambitions and the means it employs to achieve and project such ambitions. In this essay, I therefore revisit the notion of ‘Europe in Space’ from an institutional perspective, seeking to clarify what it may indeed signify.

Grasping this institutional and cultural plurality is not straightforward. Ongoing and longstanding debates exist regarding the institutional architecture of European space governance, not least the relationship between the European Space Agency (ESA), the European Union (EU) and their respective member states. A particularly sensitive matter, caution is called for when addressing it. At the same time, it shows the plurality of perspectives on space policy.

The European Space Agency is not an EU body but a formally independent international organization bound by the constraints inherent in such a status, both in terms of governance and in the scope of its competences. This situation generates a persistent tension. Although the ESA views itself as a space agency in the full sense of the term – formulating and conducting a space policy – (most of) its member states primarily conceive of it as an international organization tasked with only the execution of programmes collectively decided at the triennial ministerial meetings.

For its part, the European Union has held a formal shared competence in space since the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 189 TFEU), even though its involvement in the domain predates this framework, going back at least to the late 1970s. Over the past two decades, the EU has considerably strengthened its engagement in space affairs, as demonstrated by a series of strategic announcements – most recently the Commission’s proposal of an EU Space Act – as well as the launch of ambitious programmes.² The institutional logics governing the EU and ESA differ markedly, whether in terms of budgetary cycles and programmatic decision-making (the EU operating on a seven-year financial framework, ESA on a three-year cycle), or implementation methods (the EU relying on competition, whereas ESA applies the principle of geographical return).³

The year 2025 marks a moment of convergence for the organizations, each facing a milestone in the shaping of Europe’s space future: the ESA with its triennial Ministerial Council in November, and the EU with the start of negotiations for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF 2028–2034). This institutional ‘alignment of the planets’ offers a valuable opportunity for them to work together towards a shared vision and joint initiatives. Such collaboration is not unprecedented: several flagship programmes – Copernicus (Earth observation), Galileo (satellite navigation), and, more recently, Iris² (secure telecommunications) – already embody structured and formalized cooperation between the two organizations. The ESA and the EU are therefore in continuous dialogue and operational partnership. Yet, European space governance remains embedded within a distinctive triangulation, whose three poles – the ESA, the EU and their member states – are currently recalibrating their balance. A particular complexity arises from the fact that the membership of the two organizations of the triangle does not fully overlap: for instance, the United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland are ESA members outside the EU.

When looking at the member states, the picture becomes even richer: there are almost as many visions of space ambitions as there are states in Europe. ‘Almost’ because commitment in this field is far from equal among all states: some, including France, Germany, Italy and the UK, have developed historical expertise in the field, some in launches, others in satellites, or even both. For each of these states, their space ambitions depend on the historical context within which their space programmes were conceived, as well as the subsequent (or anticipated) development of specific capabilities in the field, particularly by their national industries. Frictions exist between states, with some preferring to have their satellites launched by third parties outside Europe.

This adds a further layer to the analysis of a pluralistic European space sector, namely the European space sector of manufacturers. Value chains of the space industry have continental and even global links, yet they remain embedded within distinctly national frameworks, notably with a range of established national mechanisms to support the space industries and start-ups, which contribute to the nationalization of the space economy. This does not prevent the European Commission from considering the European space market to be integrated, as it does in its recent proposal for an EU Space Act.

Europe’s approach to space could be compared to an orchestra, one in which the musicians consider themselves conductors, but still, sometimes despite everything, manage to play harmoniously (i.e., strategically). The metaphor highlights two essential points. First, the ongoing institutional debate in Europe is often presented as a question as to which institution would be best suited to embody space policy; hence, metaphorically synthesized, the question facing Europe today is who, within this triangular configuration, is to assume the role of conductor? Is it even possible to find a single conductor? In fact, the conductor can change depending on the score that needs to be played. Secondly, the metaphor serves as a useful reminder of why, in the early 1960s, space appeared particularly appropriate for Europeanization. This process began with the creation of the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) and the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO). Although these two institutions emerged in distinct strategic contexts and pursued different objectives, they nevertheless shared a broader aspiration: to propel Europe into space. In 1975, they were merged to form the European Space Agency (ESA). From the outset, Europeanized space ambitions were designed to serve two purposes: first, to coordinate the programmes of the various spacefaring states across the continent, and second, to undertake joint programmes through pooled resources. The intention was to prevent cacophony, to synchronize the instruments, and to secure a place for Europe in the space race then dominated by the United States and the USSR. The orchestra was thus assembled, although no conductor was formally appointed – at most, a concert hall was erected in the form of the ESA. The imperative to play in concert remains as relevant today as it was then, not least to project greater power. Yet recent developments in the European space sector have introduced occasional dissonance.

The pressing need, however, is to play in harmony. The current reconfiguration of the European space landscape touches upon all domains of engagement. The refrain is a familiar one, yet the (relatively) new modes of economic organization in the space sector are reshaping the way in which space policies are conceived; at times moving from the servicing of genuine space needs to a vision solely driven by the growth of the space economy. The world’s current troubled geopolitical context, alongside the reconfiguration of transatlantic relations, places space technologies back at the very centre of strategy. These technologies are key not only to the resilience of our societies but also to pressing security and defence requirements, including geolocation, telecommunications and territorial surveillance. At the same time, the widespread distrust elsewhere in the world towards funding for scientific programmes monitoring climate change highlights the importance of Europe’s autonomous capacity in Earth observation, embodied in flagship initiatives such as Copernicus. Meanwhile, space exploration programmes are gaining momentum globally – particularly in the United States, China and India. The ESA, which has long been involved in exploration initiatives, is now called upon to reaffirm its position, beginning with its Ministerial Council in November. Finally, the growing awareness of the environmental impact of technologies, including space technologies, requires both a collective reflection on the uses of space activities – anchored in clearly identified needs – and the development of space technologies whose environmental footprint is properly assessed and limited.

In this context, however, the definitional challenge of ‘Europe in space’ is more pressing than ever. Primarily, it refers to the decision made sixty years ago to regionalize a substantial portion of the continent’s space policy. The recent establishment of the African Space Agency demonstrates that, even in the 2020s, the regional scale remains crucial for coordinating and implementing space policies. It also confirms, in a certain way, that the pragmatic character of the European countries’ decades-long gamble in regionalizing parts of their space policy is more relevant than ever.

One might argue, however, that it is necessary to re-examine what this gamble signifies institutionally; indeed, that is one of the questions currently stirring debate across the European space community. But it is far from certain that this question could ever find a single, definitive answer if it rested on just one of the three poles of the European space triangle: the EU, the ESA or the member states. It is even far from certain that the solution might be found in merging the ESA into the EU, as is sometimes proposed. Even the most cursory analysis demonstrates that enacting such a scenario is highly uncertain, if not impossible. Perhaps the mistake lies in assuming a fixed definition of ‘Europe in space’, as if it were an institution per se. In reality, ‘Europe in space’ is more of process. It is a continual negotiation between visions, interests and sovereignties, constantly reshaped by crises, ambitions and opportunities, conditioned by the institutional differences of each of the three poles. What has ultimately allowed this process to endure for six decades is not the absence of rivalry, but rather the affectio societatis – the shared, if fragile, will of European partners to build together what none could achieve alone (at least not without huge effort or delays), which transcends the institutions involved.

The years ahead may lead European actors to reflect on alternative institutional arrangements capable of bringing their diverse components closer together. But the challenge is to accept institutional pluralism not as a weakness but as the very condition of a shared project, and to transform institutional competition into complementarity. In this respect, the question of 'Europe in space' is a tripartite one: institutional – how to redraw the balance; political – how to define a continental space identity; and programmatic – how to determine the real needs that space programmes should serve. Institutional pluralism makes it possible to accommodate each need within the most appropriate framework, through a form of subsidiarity, by dedicating the relevant programme to the relevant institution, served precisely by each institutional logic and economic construction (hence strategically using competition and geographical return). The year 2025 is an opportunity to bring the vision of 'Europe in space' back to the negotiating table, to rediscover the strategic opportunity offered by institutional pluralism. To refer back to the metaphor of the orchestra, let us recall that in such an ensemble, the conductor never seeks to fully dominate but rather ensures that, by playing the right musical score at the right moment, each musician can realize the full potential of their instrument. Only then will the European symphony of space have a chance of being heard on the global stage.