Europe must rearm to protect its vital interests and to honour the commitments it has already made, as well as those envisaged for the future, particularly in relation to security guarantees for Ukraine and to protection of member states themselves, endangered by provocations and direct threats. For the first time in decades, Europeans must be capable of confronting a powerful adversary without relying on their American ally and be prepared – as General Burkhard remarked before leaving his post as French chief of defence – for ‘imposed wars’ rather than the ‘chosen’ ones fought in Afghanistan and Africa in the recent past.i An imposed war, such as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, does not allow the attacked nation to determine the level of force or the duration of deployment. This harsh reality was foreseeable for years and has been evident for months. Yet this summer, the accumulation of deeply worrying developments has highlighted the difficult decisions and the struggle Europe is now confronted with. The reaction to them of the Coalition of the Willing, despite many uncertainties, could indicate the way forward for Europeans.
In recent months many troubling events have unfolded: the Tianjin summit revealed how ‘isolated’ those who claimed to be ‘isolating’ Putin actually are. Moreover, on Ukraine or the Middle East and even Africa – where our interests and our security are at stake – Europeans have been spectacularly sidelined by our US ally. Recent events in Poland have confirmed that the defence of EU member states themselves is at stake.
In Anchorage, President Trump set the stage for a peace process in Ukraine, hand in hand with Vladimir Putin, without the presence of either Europeans or Ukrainians, who then had to rush to Washington the following day. Trump shifted from the position, shared by Europeans, that a ceasefire should be the first step, to embrace Putin’s view that a peace settlement should be the objective. Meanwhile, military operations continue, and Russian strikes are intensifying, violating Poland’s airspace.
French and British headquarters, leading the Coalition of the Willing on security guarantees, are planning for a possible deployment following a hypothetical arrangement about which they know little. Does the Pentagon know much more? Only one point has been publicly confirmed: President Putin does not accept European involvement. Yet planning continues, in anticipation of a negotiated settlement between the White House and its Kremlin ‘friends’. We might ask whether they are truly friends, and will they remain so?
The value of this joint planning, led by France and the United Kingdom, under the direct authority of the chiefs of defence, should not be underestimated. Firstly, it responds to American demands: Europeans are demonstrating readiness, political will and the capacity to generate appropriate forces. It also sends a message to Moscow: Europe is not powerless. Most importantly, it brings together – exceptionally in peacetime – the military authorities of most European States, alongside partners, such as Turkey and Canada, in strong coordination with the US, NATO and the EU. Their work is validated by defence ministers and heads of state and government. Europeans are demonstrating agency.
Nevertheless, major uncertainties remain. Will Trump and Putin, working mainly by themselves, reach an agreement on peace and security guarantees, which are inseparable issues? What is the timeframe? The probability of a short-term outcome appears increasingly low. A European presence on the ground presupposes that Russia will abandon its current opposition. If negotiations stall while civilian targets in Ukraine are bombed, Donald Trump’s reaction is unpredictable. He might underreact and then more or less drop the issue, or overreact, possibly even militarily. What would that mean for the Europeans, who would likely not be part of either decision?
Another particularly insidious development is the growing – and now explicitly acknowledged – link between trade and security in US–European relations. This link has always existed and not only for the EU. Fifty years ago, when automobile quotas were being discussed with Japan, the European Commission sent outstanding negotiators to Tokyo; yet the Americans secured better results, simply by hinting at a possible withdrawal of the US fleet. It is now widely recognized that economic power without military power is no power at all. Never has Washington wielded this connection so crudely, nor Europeans accepted it so meekly. Pascal Lamy recently recalled that during his time as EU Trade Commissioner, the US never threatened retaliation within NATO.
Unless Europe reduces its dependence on the US, it will remain vulnerable to such blackmail. A future administration might be less rude, but the leverage will remain, deeply ingrained. Recently, the president of the European Council, speaking in Slovenia, supported the trade deal by explicitly linking trade and security. ‘An escalation on tariffs with a key ally would be risky and unwise when our eastern border is under threat; ensuring the involvement of the US in the security guarantees for Ukraine was an absolute priority.’ But do 15% tariffs ensure this involvement? What is the next step – abandoning digital regulation? And then what? Ultimately, American involvement will depend on Donald Trump’s gut response to Vladimir Putin’s behaviour and any obstruction to his peace agenda.
A further unwelcome development is the cacophony among European actors, exacerbated by ongoing strategic tension and looming risks. During her visit to the Northern and Eastern members of the Union, the President of the Commission mentioned planning for an ‘EU’ deployment in Ukraine. German Defence Minister Pistorius responded forcefully, denying any EU role in security guarantees for Ukraine since the EU has ‘no competence whatsoever when it comes to positioning troops’. The fact that this statement is not quite accurate does not really matter. Within the Coalition of the Willing, nobody is considering an EU deployment. And while the EU would have some legal basis for such a deployment under Title V of the Lisbon Treaty, and even has some experience in sending troops or observers, the Commission president has no role to play here.
No easy path lies ahead. Yet the determination, capacity and sense of community among European States – driven by military authorities and politically – should lead to action beyond planning for security guarantees and support to the Ukrainian army.
France now hosts the Coalition’s headquarters, in close coordination with the UK, with its rotation a possibility. But the timing and modalities of possible deployment remain uncertain. Europeans should take this opportunity to define and implement permanent but flexible command arrangements, based on the lessons now being identified. We should provide a core structure, available for willing and able nations, with command, control and communication systems that must be autonomous but interoperable with other structures, particularly NATO.
The pressure of events makes the present choice pragmatic, timely and politically acceptable for all participants, but the question is whether it can it be sustained. A multitude of command structures already exist, from NATO headquarters (SHAPE in particular), national headquarters, and EU Military Staff, to sectoral or various multinational command structures, such as the European Air Transport Command in Eindhoven or EUROCORPS in Strasbourg.ii Staffing this plurality of structures is a heavy burden; many of them are fit for purpose but underused. Considering the demanding military operations we may face, and the uncertainties about American involvement and consequently about the availability of SHAPE, improvised multinational headquarters are not an optimal long-term option.
The ‘core group’ of willing and able nations needs to be fully equipped with secure command, control and communication systems; it must be authorized and enabled to secretly plan for various scenarios and train jointly. The work of the present Coalition of the Willing demonstrates how vital trust, confidentiality and determination are.
Such a core group could also drive the acquisition of major enabling capabilities and their optimal use in cooperation. These capabilities could complement – ensuring ‘burden sharing’ – or, if necessary, substitute for the US enablers. The weakness of current European resolve is its continued dependence on American support. This is especially critical in intelligence, for instance in monitoring a ceasefire, but also in other areas such as assets for positioning, communications, security in space, air-to-air refuelling and air defence. Our shortfalls and priorities have been fully documented in both NATO and the EU.iii Work is under way at the national, EU, OCCAR and NATO level.iv But implementation remains too slow and bureaucratic. What is needed is decisive action now by a realistic core group, under the leadership of the military authorities. This core group can and should use the existing instruments, in and outside the EU to deliver these capabilities. The tools exist, but they require a firm, expert and legitimate hand.
This summer, a dynamic has been created, bringing chiefs of defence together as primary actors, directly connected to the political level of defence ministers and heads of state or government. Events beyond their control may lead to disappointment or different challenges. But for the first time in decades we see European militaries working together, outside NATO, in the highest intensity scenarios. Europe must rearm to protect its vital interests and to honour the commitments it has already made, as well as those envisaged for the future, particularly in relation to security guarantees for Ukraine and to protection of member states themselves, endangered by provocations and direct threats. For the first time in decades, Europeans must be capable of confronting a powerful adversary without relying on their American ally and be prepared – as General Burkhard remarked before leaving his post as French chief of defence – for ‘imposed wars’ rather than the ‘chosen’ ones fought in Afghanistan and Africa in the recent past.i An imposed war, such as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, does not allow the attacked nation to determine the level of force or the duration of deployment. This harsh reality was foreseeable for years and has been evident for months. Yet this summer, the accumulation of deeply worrying developments has highlighted the difficult decisions and the struggle Europe is now confronted with. The reaction to them of the Coalition of the Willing, despite many uncertainties, could indicate the way forward for Europeans.
In recent months many troubling events have unfolded: the Tianjin summit revealed how ‘isolated’ those who claimed to be ‘isolating’ Putin actually are. Moreover, on Ukraine or the Middle East and even Africa – where our interests and our security are at stake – Europeans have been spectacularly sidelined by our US ally. Recent events in Poland have confirmed that the defence of EU member states themselves is at stake.
In Anchorage, President Trump set the stage for a peace process in Ukraine, hand in hand with Vladimir Putin, without the presence of either Europeans or Ukrainians, who then had to rush to Washington the following day. Trump shifted from the position, shared by Europeans, that a ceasefire should be the first step, to embrace Putin’s view that a peace settlement should be the objective. Meanwhile, military operations continue, and Russian strikes are intensifying, violating Poland’s airspace.
French and British headquarters, leading the Coalition of the Willing on security guarantees, are planning for a possible deployment following a hypothetical arrangement about which they know little. Does the Pentagon know much more? Only one point has been publicly confirmed: President Putin does not accept European involvement. Yet planning continues, in anticipation of a negotiated settlement between the White House and its Kremlin ‘friends’. We might ask whether they are truly friends, and will they remain so?
The value of this joint planning, led by France and the United Kingdom, under the direct authority of the chiefs of defence, should not be underestimated. Firstly, it responds to American demands: Europeans are demonstrating readiness, political will and the capacity to generate appropriate forces. It also sends a message to Moscow: Europe is not powerless. Most importantly, it brings together – exceptionally in peacetime – the military authorities of most European States, alongside partners, such as Turkey and Canada, in strong coordination with the US, NATO and the EU. Their work is validated by defence ministers and heads of state and government. Europeans are demonstrating agency.
Nevertheless, major uncertainties remain. Will Trump and Putin, working mainly by themselves, reach an agreement on peace and security guarantees, which are inseparable issues? What is the timeframe? The probability of a short-term outcome appears increasingly low. A European presence on the ground presupposes that Russia will abandon its current opposition. If negotiations stall while civilian targets in Ukraine are bombed, Donald Trump’s reaction is unpredictable. He might underreact and then more or less drop the issue, or overreact, possibly even militarily. What would that mean for the Europeans, who would likely not be part of either decision?
Another particularly insidious development is the growing – and now explicitly acknowledged – link between trade and security in US–European relations. This link has always existed and not only for the EU. Fifty years ago, when automobile quotas were being discussed with Japan, the European Commission sent outstanding negotiators to Tokyo; yet the Americans secured better results, simply by hinting at a possible withdrawal of the US fleet. It is now widely recognized that economic power without military power is no power at all. Never has Washington wielded this connection so crudely, nor Europeans accepted it so meekly. Pascal Lamy recently recalled that during his time as EU Trade Commissioner, the US never threatened retaliation within NATO.
Unless Europe reduces its dependence on the US, it will remain vulnerable to such blackmail. A future administration might be less rude, but the leverage will remain, deeply ingrained. Recently, the president of the European Council, speaking in Slovenia, supported the trade deal by explicitly linking trade and security. ‘An escalation on tariffs with a key ally would be risky and unwise when our eastern border is under threat; ensuring the involvement of the US in the security guarantees for Ukraine was an absolute priority.’ But do 15% tariffs ensure this involvement? What is the next step – abandoning digital regulation? And then what? Ultimately, American involvement will depend on Donald Trump’s gut response to Vladimir Putin’s behaviour and any obstruction to his peace agenda.
A further unwelcome development is the cacophony among European actors, exacerbated by ongoing strategic tension and looming risks. During her visit to the Northern and Eastern members of the Union, the President of the Commission mentioned planning for an ‘EU’ deployment in Ukraine. German Defence Minister Pistorius responded forcefully, denying any EU role in security guarantees for Ukraine since the EU has ‘no competence whatsoever when it comes to positioning troops’. The fact that this statement is not quite accurate does not really matter. Within the Coalition of the Willing, nobody is considering an EU deployment. And while the EU would have some legal basis for such a deployment under Title V of the Lisbon Treaty, and even has some experience in sending troops or observers, the Commission president has no role to play here.
No easy path lies ahead. Yet the determination, capacity and sense of community among European States – driven by military authorities and politically – should lead to action beyond planning for security guarantees and support to the Ukrainian army.
France now hosts the Coalition’s headquarters, in close coordination with the UK, with its rotation a possibility. But the timing and modalities of possible deployment remain uncertain. Europeans should take this opportunity to define and implement permanent but flexible command arrangements, based on the lessons now being identified. We should provide a core structure, available for willing and able nations, with command, control and communication systems that must be autonomous but interoperable with other structures, particularly NATO.
The pressure of events makes the present choice pragmatic, timely and politically acceptable for all participants, but the question is whether it can it be sustained. A multitude of command structures already exist, from NATO headquarters (SHAPE in particular), national headquarters, and EU Military Staff, to sectoral or various multinational command structures, such as the European Air Transport Command in Eindhoven or EUROCORPS in Strasbourg.ii Staffing this plurality of structures is a heavy burden; many of them are fit for purpose but underused. Considering the demanding military operations we may face, and the uncertainties about American involvement and consequently about the availability of SHAPE, improvised multinational headquarters are not an optimal long-term option.
The ‘core group’ of willing and able nations needs to be fully equipped with secure command, control and communication systems; it must be authorized and enabled to secretly plan for various scenarios and train jointly. The work of the present Coalition of the Willing demonstrates how vital trust, confidentiality and determination are.
Such a core group could also drive the acquisition of major enabling capabilities and their optimal use in cooperation. These capabilities could complement – ensuring ‘burden sharing’ – or, if necessary, substitute for the US enablers. The weakness of current European resolve is its continued dependence on American support. This is especially critical in intelligence, for instance in monitoring a ceasefire, but also in other areas such as assets for positioning, communications, security in space, air-to-air refuelling and air defence. Our shortfalls and priorities have been fully documented in both NATO and the EU.iii Work is under way at the national, EU, OCCAR and NATO level.iv But implementation remains too slow and bureaucratic. What is needed is decisive action now by a realistic core group, under the leadership of the military authorities. This core group can and should use the existing instruments, in and outside the EU to deliver these capabilities. The tools exist, but they require a firm, expert and legitimate hand.
This summer, a dynamic has been created, bringing chiefs of defence together as primary actors, directly connected to the political level of defence ministers and heads of state or government. Events beyond their control may lead to disappointment or different challenges. But for the first time in decades we see European militaries working together, outside NATO, in the highest intensity scenarios.
Notes
1 https://www.politico.eu/article/thierry-burkhard-leurope-doit-sendurcir-ou-risquer-de-devenir-un-animal-traque/ ↩
2 SHAPE is the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, located in Mons, Belgium; EATC is the European Air Transport Command, in Eindhoven, the Netherlands, and is the multinational command for air mobility (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain); Eurocorps has multinational headquarters in Strasbourg, France (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain).↩
3 See a previous BIG article by Claude-France Arnould on this issue, https://www.big-europe.eu/publications/2025-06-24-russia-disregards-europe-at-its-peril ↩
4 OCCAR is an organization for joint armament cooperation located in Bonn, whose 6 members are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. It concentrates on management of programmes.
About the author
Claude-France Arnould is Senior Fellow for European Defence at the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics. She was Executive Director of the European Defence Agency (2011–15), before serving as France’s Ambassador to Belgium (2015–19).