Von der Leyen sidesteps Europe’s summer of humiliation

European leaders and policymakers emerged from the summer in a bleak mood for the autumn ahead. On a golf resort in Scotland owned by businessman Donald J. Trump, the EU had to swallow a sobering trade agreement with the United States, a one-sided tariff deal, obliging the bloc to purchase US natural gas and weapons to the amounts of USD 750 billion and USD 600 billion. Just two weeks later in Alaska, the US president rolled out the red carpet for his Russian counterpart Putin. With regard to continued support for Ukraine, the worst has been avoided for now, thanks to the deft diplomatic counter-manoeuvre of the White House visit by President Zelenskyy and seven European leaders on 19 August. But this mild success did not efface the overall sentiment of humiliation. Economic power, the EU’s long-time pride, does not translate into political power or strategic clout.

It fell this week to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to steer the conversation and point the way forward. Her State of the Union address to the Parliament, the annual kick-off to the EU political season, lends itself perfectly to the task. Speaking of Europe needing a 'fighting spirit', her language was starker than in previous years: 'Battlelines for a new world order based on power are being drawn right now.'

Opening on Ukraine, the frontline of European security, yet another tranche of sanctions against Russia was launched and new support for the Ukrainian army announced. Her words of solidarity with Poland on the day that Russian drones violated its airspace drew plaudits from the chamber. Then to Gaza, on which, following a barrage of sometimes personal criticism and in the face of ever more unacceptable Israeli action, Von der Leyen shifted her position. What then followed was a whistlestop tour of EU initiatives; as all Commission departments seek their time in the sun, the audience had to listen to proposals on everything from affordable small cars to housing. Ambitious announcements on defence and clean tech stood out.

But on relations with the US, a topic tactically sandwiched in between other things, the Commission president ducked the crucial strategic question of whether the war in Ukraine was a factor in accepting the lopsided trade deal. ‘There is no linkage between the two,’ she had stated in late August. European Council president António Costa gave a more candid assessment: ‘Escalating tensions with a key ally over tariffs, while our Eastern border is under threat, would have been an imprudent risk.’ The EU’s top trade official, Sabine Weyand, at the Alpbach Forum, remarked, ‘You have not heard me use the term negotiation, and you won’t.’ In this week’s address, von der Leyen recognized criticism but continued defending the tariff deal on economic grounds.

This points to a wider issue with the Commission president’s political style. She prefers to skirt around acknowledging trade-offs, favouring a middle ground where everything is possible: the Green Deal and industrial competitiveness; humane asylum laws and robust return policies. In an earlier speech on the EU’s digital strategy, she claimed the bloc could out-compete Silicon Valley while imposing stricter regulations, leaving audiences puzzled. It goes with a rhetorical style laden with the passive voice, with the speaker not naming places or people (no single Commissioner or national leader got a mention on Wednesday, not even Trump) and where everything seems to be happening to Europe. Action then somehow magically unfolds from a roadmap, toolbox or compass.

This depoliticizing reflex was on show again in her address, for instance on enlargement. Bringing in Ukraine and Moldova will make the Union ‘larger’ but whether that also means ‘stronger’ (as she asserted) depends on factors beyond the EU’s control. She compared these eastern accessions to the post-1989 ‘reunification’ of east and west, glossing over the chasmic difference between the friendly ‘End of History’ period and today’s brutal ‘Return of History’, which presents tough dilemmas.

Certainly, any Commission president has many constituencies to cater for: while pleasing the hemicycle of the European Parliament, he or she must also be mindful of the top floor of the Berlaymont and views in EU capitals. European coalition politics requires keeping majorities together, playing to various sensitivities – left versus right, trade versus protectionism, hawkish versus pacifist. These consensus-building skills have been honed by generations of Christian Democratic and centrist political leaders, whether in Von der Leyen’s native Germany, Belgium or Italy.

The problem is that in the age of geopolitics and geo-economics, everything revolves around strategic trade-offs and choices. We cannot always have it all, and the public is well aware of this. President Costa has been more honest in recognizing the 'unbalanced trade framework'. If we refuse to do this, decisions will be poorly prepared and public discourse lose credibility. The language of win-win may sound appealing, but it masks the harder geopolitical realities facing Europe. In a Report on economic security to be published later this month, BIG will make the case that Europe is capable of making strategic choices and propose a new way for the bloc to deal with geo-economic trade-offs.

As Europe transitions into the autumn, after a sobering summer, regaining a sense of agency and dignity will be crucial. Sensing this need, Von der Leyen repeatedly insisted on ‘Europe’s independence’ and on ‘shaping destiny’. For this welcome rallying cry to sound less hollow, it should have acknowledged constraints and risks – such as the pressure the US is now exerting on Europe’s technology regulation and climate ambition as the price for the tariff deal – and then set out a path.

True strategic independence requires the military rearmament and reorganisation that Europe is working on but also the levers to push back against foes and allies when it finds itself cornered. Such leverage cannot be built overnight and demands long-term strategic planning. Brussels-driven initiatives alone will not suffice; the political will and coordinated commitment of all EU governments at the highest level are paramount to its success.