Trump's energy trap for Europe

In September, Donald Trump put a price on sanctions against Moscow. In a Truth Social post, he declared that the United States would act only if NATO allies stopped buying Russian oil and imposed punitive tariffs on China and India. Days earlier, his energy secretary Chris Wright had pressed Brussels to abandon Russian gas not by 2027, as planned, but within six to twelve months by replacing it with US liquefied natural gas (LNG).

These American proposals were not phrased as coordination among allies but as ultimatums. They reveal the EU’s persistent energy vulnerability: in trying to break free from Gazprom, Europe risks stumbling into a new dependency. Once hailed as ‘molecules of freedom’, US oil and gas now expose the Union to the political demands and whims of the White House. The Americans’ hand may be warmer than Gazprom’s, but it can still twist Europe’s arm.

Dependency reborn

Europe’s predicament came into sharp focus over the summer, when two competing visions of its energy future crystallized. In June, the European Commission tabled a proposal to eliminate Russian oil and gas imports entirely by 2027. The EU committed itself to ending its dependence on Russian energy soon after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It agreed bans on Russian coal, seaborne oil deliveries and transshipments (not deliveries) of Russian LNG, but the details of how and when to cut off the remaining energy ties remained undecided.

The June proposal offered the first concrete timeline for finally closing the book on Russia as Europe’s energy supplier, from Gazprom’s gas to Rosatom’s nuclear fuel and the Druzhba oil pipeline. Although the plan still awaits approval by the member states, the prevailing tone in Brussels was one of emancipation. In her September 2025 State of the Union address, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen underlined this shift: ‘We are now on the path to energy independence’.

In July, however, a different vision surfaced. Trump and Von der Leyen announced a sweeping trade deal in which, the White House proclaimed, the EU ‘will purchase’ $750 billion of American fossil and nuclear energy by 2028.¹ Brussels’ more cautious phrasing was that it ‘intends to procure’ energy from the US.² The semantic gap was telling. For Washington, the commitment was binding; for Brussels, it was aspirational. But the message was clear enough: Europe was shifting its energy dependence from Moscow to Washington.

The $750 billion mirage

For all the talk about partnership, the deal effectively locks in the bloc’s energy supply to a single seller. In 2024, the US already accounted for 21% of the EU’s oil, LNG and coal imports, worth around $75 billion. Scaling this to $250 billion a year for the next three years would mean sourcing around 70% of Europe’s energy imports from the US. For comparison, Russia accounted for around 40% of Europe’s total gas imports before 2022.

More importantly, the $750 billion figure is an unrealistic ask. To meet it, the EU would have to triple American imports within three years, divert LNG cargoes already contracted to Asia, and shun the cheaper Norwegian pipeline gas. The US itself exported only $166 billion in oil and gas in total in 2024, meaning it would have to divert all of its exports to the EU, and then some. The numbers simply do not add up.³ Moreover, oil and LNG supply contracts are signed by companies, not by the European Commission or even EU governments.

Yet Wright’s September tour in Brussels was meant to show that the US means business. He added that the EU’s dependence on US energy would be long-term, not just the three years until the $750 billion is spent.⁴ He also pressed the EU to relax its regulations, such as its Methane Regulation, that could block US shale gas on climate grounds. The fact that Wright is a former fracking executive no doubt made his message even more irksome.

The price of ‘freedom gas’

All of this demonstrates who is now setting the terms of Europe’s energy security. When Europe lost access to Russian gas, US ‘freedom gas’ came to the rescue. At first this was pure market substitution: cargoes went where prices pulled them. But Trump has since politicized the flow. By tying US energy supplies to political deals – the July trade agreement, sanctions on Russia, tariffs on China and India, and EU deregulation – he is turning Europe’s energy lifeline into leverage. What began as market substitution now risks becoming political subordination.

EU leaders, for their part, also mix political motives with commercial deals, although less openly. For many, the $750 billion pledge is as much a hedge against military uncertainty as an economic concession to avert stifling tariffs. In the shadow of Ukraine, securing American gas can be seen as a way of shoring up US protection. The logic is the same as with Kyiv’s attempts to barter its mineral wealth for security guarantees from Washington, only less overt. Either way, the result is further politicization of energy supplies: a political insurance premium dressed up as a trade deal.

Still paying Putin

Trump, however, is not wrong to highlight Europe’s unfinished energy business with Moscow.⁵ Even after two years of sanctions, European payments for Russian fossil fuels still exceed its financial aid to Kyiv – around €20–25 billion in 2024 versus less than €20 billion in total EU support. Imports of Russian LNG rose by more than 20% compared to pre-war levels, with France, Belgium and Spain among the largest buyers.⁶ And Hungary and Slovakia remain almost wholly dependent on the Druzhba pipeline for their oil supplies.

The dependence is not only direct but also indirect. Russian crude still ends up in European petrol tanks after being refined in Indian or Turkish plants and then re-exported. In the first half of 2025, imports of Russian fertilizers, essentially natural gas in disguise, surged by nearly 50% year-on-year. These flows are harder to police and highlight how Moscow adapts, finding backdoors into Europe’s market even as Brussels insists it is locking the Russians out.

The Commission’s recent proposal to accelerate the LNG phaseout to 2026, as part of its nineteenth sanctions package, shows that Trump’s pressure is working.⁷ The package also attempts to close some loopholes, lowering the oil price cap to US $47.60, blacklisting Rosneft and Gazpromneft, and sanctioning hundreds of shadow-fleet vessels. The EU was already on the path to phasing out Russian energy, but Trump’s ultimatum may have provided the push to move faster and aim higher.

Sanctions with strings attached

Still, sanctions can succeed in cutting off Russian oil and gas exports only if the US enforces them with secondary measures against non-EU buyers. Trump, however, has made his support conditional on NATO countries cutting off Russian oil altogether. This is a tall order when leaders like Orbán, Fico and Erdoğan remain dependent on Russian oil supplies. Ironically, it was precisely to avoid vetoes from Budapest and Bratislava that the Commission proposed a regulation (passable by qualified majority rather than unanimity) as the legal tool for the phaseout from Russia. Whether Trump’s personal rapport with Orbán and Fico makes them more pliable remains to be seen.

Turkey complicates matters further. A pivotal NATO ally controlling access to the Black Sea, Ankara has refused to sign up to Western restrictions on trade with Moscow. Instead, it has deepened its role as one of Russia’s largest fossil fuel clients. President Erdoğan, already grappling with a cost-of-living crisis, is reliant on cheap Russian energy to keep discontent in check. The question is whether Trump is willing, or even able, to push him harder.

Trump’s second demand, that NATO allies impose tariffs of 50-100% on China and India unless they stop buying Russian oil, is even harder for Europe to swallow. For the EU, Beijing is a far more important economic partner than for the US, and even the US backtracked from the high tariffs it put in place in early April. India, meanwhile, is on the cusp of finalizing a trade deal with the EU; Von der Leyen made New Delhi one of her first foreign stops after starting her second term, bringing the entire College of Commissioners in tow. Trump’s ultimatum cuts directly across European strategy.

The American sanctions-for-tariffs offer thus reveals a strategic misalignment between the US and Europe. For Europe, Russia is the existential threat on its borders. For Washington, Russia is leverage, useful for pressuring allies and for drawing them into a larger contest with Beijing. By binding itself so heavily to an American energy supply, Europe risks underwriting someone else’s strategic priority while its own remains unresolved.

Comforting energy illusions

This is where the parallel with Gazprom becomes inescapable. In 2022, Europeans swore never again to be dependent on a single supplier able to dictate terms. Yet the current trajectory risks reproducing the very same trap, only with different colours.

The counterargument often goes that reliance on US energy carries less political risk. However, to assume that US energy is different, because America is a democracy, producers are fragmented and exports are market driven, is to indulge in comforting illusions. The reality is that Washington is equally capable of weaponizing interdependence. Licences, sanctions and tariffs make molecules political.

History offers reminders. Eisenhower cut off oil supplies to Britain and France during the Suez Crisis to force their withdrawal from Egypt. In the 1970s, the Nixon administration imposed a crude oil export ban to combat inflation. More recently, Washington has sanctioned Venezuelan and Iranian oil, Russian gas and even third-country buyers. Even Biden, Europe’s trusted ally, paused LNG export licences.⁸ The assumption that US energy is somehow immune to political disruption is wishful thinking.

Nor is US shale a stable foundation for Europe’s security. A lot of US export capacity lies on the hurricane-prone Gulf Coast, where a single extreme weather event could disrupt supply. Production relies on constant drilling, as shale output declines much faster than conventional oil and gas. Without sustained investment in drilling new wells, output falls rapidly. The sector is already showing signs of strain, with oversupply driving down prices and forcing layoffs across the industry. For Trump, the timing is convenient: pushing Europe to absorb surplus US oil and gas just as a new wave of export capacity is about to flood global markets.

Is Europe trapped between Moscow, Washington and Beijing?

Trump’s energy trap for Europe therefore operates on two levels. Tactically, he ties US sanctions on Moscow to Europe's willingness to support his tactics against China, a colossal act of self-harm for an economy as open as the EU’s. Strategically, he binds Europe ever more tightly to hydrocarbons – at the point when Europe has pledged to decarbonize – with supply dependent on his own political capriciousness and shale reserves with steep decline rates.

If the EU is to spend $750 billion, it would be wiser to channel it directly into Europe’s clean energy transition, such as in grids, storage and renewables, rather than into a fossil fuel dependency that risks replaying the Gazprom error. Some argue that scaling up clean energy and climate ambition would damage Europe’s competitiveness, but this misreads the challenge: climate ambition is in fact also technological ambition, the foundation of Europe’s future competitiveness.

A second worry is that the energy transition would only create a different kind of vulnerability, by tying Europe more closely to Chinese clean-tech supply chains. However, it is misleading to frame Europe’s options as a binary choice between American hydrocarbons and Chinese green technologies. The two dependencies are not symmetrical. Fossil fuels tie the EU into a volatile, short-term relationship that can be weaponized overnight. Clean technologies, though concentrated in Chinese hands, reduce vulnerabilities over time by lowering overall exposure to energy imports.

Facing hard questions

Europe needs to confront some hard truths. If Russian energy is phased out, what should replace it? More American LNG, with all its political conditions? African gas, which might create further carbon lock-in at a time when the whole climate regime is under duress? How much is Europe prepared to pay, economically and strategically, to tighten the squeeze on Moscow while accepting Trump’s energy dominance? And what balance does it want between reliance on Washington’s hydrocarbons and on Beijing’s clean tech?

These are not abstract debates, especially amid lingering competitiveness pressures in Europe’s industries and the persistent risk of another winter of discontent. Ultimately, the point of this essay is not to argue that Europe has full freedom of choice, but that it must face trade-offs with eyes wide open.

Europe’s choice is not between Gazprom’s pipelines, America’s LNG cargoes and Chinese clean tech, but between dependence and transformation. True independence lies in choosing a new path.