German astronaut Hans Schlegel working on the exterior of ESA's Columbus module during a spacewalk. Image: ESA / NASA
(more)(less)
Persistent transatlantic tensions have prompted Europeans to strengthen their strategic autonomy in the space domain. Reducing the continent’s critical dependence on space technologies that are essential to both economic activity and continental security is now widely acknowledged as a priority. The recent launcher crisis, which temporarily grounded Europe’s means of access to space, made a profound impression on decision-makers, even though this issue remains one of the principal friction points between member states, particularly France and Germany. The prominent role of satellite technologies in ongoing geopolitical upheavals, such as the war in Ukraine, constitutes another driving factor, especially as Low Earth Orbit connectivity has emerged as a significant strategic asset. Moreover, strategic autonomy in space feeds into broader contemporary concerns over securing Europe’s full autonomy in key technologies, an autonomy that is not only technological, but increasingly ideological.
In this respect, autumn 2025 is likely to be remembered in Europe’s space history as a moment of strategic consolidation, provided that tangible outcomes emerge from it. France and Germany both published new national space strategies, while the most recent ministerial summit of the European Space Agency agreed a record budget of €22 billion for the next three years. As the European Union pursues its work on the proposed EU Space Act, negotiations on the next Multiannual Financial Framework continue with particular emphasis on strengthening the space component. Seeking both to sustain and align itself with this strategic momentum, France has proposed to host a space summit in the first half of 2026 with Germany, in association with Italy and other states.
The determination to build a resilient European space capability was reflected at the ESA Ministerial Council in 2025, in the increase in national contributions – some of striking magnitude, such as +102 per cent in the case of Spain and +277 per cent for Poland. The three principal contributors – Germany, France and Italy – have increased their respective shares by 46, 15 and 13 per cent. Similarly, the EU’s forthcoming Multiannual Financial Framework is also expected to formalize a substantial increase in the European space budget for the 2028-34 period. This budgetary consolidation in the European space field is also observable at the national level, with the proliferation of national space strategies.
France’s National Space Strategy
This is particularly the case in France. On 12 November 2025, President Emmanuel Macron unveiled France’s National Space Strategy, at the inauguration of the Space Force Command in Toulouse. Developed by the General Secretariat for National Defence, reflecting its civil and military duality, the strategy is set for 2040 and organizes French action in space around five pillars: access to space; economic structuring; resilience and military space capabilities; scientific exploration; and, finally, international cooperation. From these stem fifteen strategic objectives.
To the meticulous Francophone reader, the sequence of adjectives in the document’s title Stratégie Nationale Spatiale is immediately striking, revealing a subtle prioritization: the proposed strategy is national before it is spatial. Yet throughout the document, ‘the national’ is frequently juxtaposed with ‘the European’, acknowledging that space policies pursued by individual states on the continent cannot be conceived independently of the collective policies implemented within the plurality of regional institutions – both public and private – that constitute the European space domain. Indeed, France is not the first European state to publish a national space strategy. Germany released its own as early as 2023 and subsequently complemented it in autumn 2025 with a space security strategy. Italy presented the main points of its strategy in early 2025. It was therefore both logical and anticipated that Paris would align itself with these exercises, opting for an analogous position to that of the continent’s most powerful spacefaring states. Yet these three existing, rather than coexisting, national strategies warrant analysis, as cooperation among these ostensible partners now often assumes the character of aggressive ‘coopetition’, depending on the sector. The exacerbated nationalization of strategic space planning offers a clear demonstration of this phenomenon. In fact, it raises the question of the intended audience for these three strategic positions: is it other European partners/coopetitors, third states, or both?
National and European harmony
The proliferation of these national strategies raises questions in a domain that is politically and to some extent institutionally Europeanized. In the ‘Europe in Space’ orchestra – as portrayed in a recent publication for BIG– the isolated initiatives of a single musician must not compromise the overall orchestral harmony, even though a conductor has yet to be appointed. Yet this partial nationalization of continental space policies is precisely what undermines the creation of a strong European space capability. This applies to launchers and orbital connectivity as well as to other, more discrete technologies, such as space nuclear power.
Let it be clear: the issue is not to dismiss the relevance of the national level in the development of European states’ space policies. Many continental spacefaring states, particularly the three leading ones, have always conceived their space policies with the national–European duality in mind: cooperating within European organizations and programmes, while simultaneously pursuing national technological and industrial development policies, and engaging in non-European cooperation, notably in the field of space exploration. Nor is the issue to present European space development as a historical inevitability. On the contrary, it is to embrace the idea that it is a choice – made several decades ago – to act in concert and at a continental scale in the pursuit of ambitious programmes that are useful to the continent. But today it is essential to recall and acknowledge this strategic choice and to safeguard the European endeavour from national fragmentation through increased coopetition. And cooperation also presupposes coordination. This does not preclude the development of national strategies, far from it, but it emphasises that these strategies must be orchestrated in harmony with those of partners, who should be regarded and behave as such rather than as aggressive competitors. In short, it entails recognizing and upholding the choice to have played and to still play the European card, whilst resisting the (sometimes atavistic) temptations of fragmentation.
Bridging the gap between space strategies and programmes
In addition to its European dimension, the very exercise of formulating a space strategy requires examination. In principle, it is commendable: its development allows for the crystallization of a set of national priorities, while its publication is a useful act of communication vis-à-vis industry and the broader public. It sets the course for industrial actors and economic stakeholders in a sector still largely sustained by public funding, and sends a signal both to international partners and to competitors. This is why numerous observers and practitioners regularly call for national space strategies within their respective states.
Yet it is equally important to look at these national strategies for what they are: a plan. This distinction is significant; space strategies must not be conflated with space programmes, even if the semantic nuance is slight: it separates the potential and the hypothetical from the actual and operational. Strategies are primarily instruments of signalling, of making strategic priorities visible. They do not guarantee in any way that all the objectives set out will be implemented through funded, technologically developed and successfully launched space programmes. Keeping this nuance in mind guards against the current tendencies within the space sector to equate vision with action and planning with execution, and to treat distant strategic horizons as fully mapped navigational routes.
Moreover, there is an intermediate instrument that lies between space strategies and space programmes – the technology roadmap – which ought to be fully leveraged at the European level. It could bridge the gap between envisioning the future and delivering capability. A technology roadmap structures the development of the required technologies to achieve long-term objectives. It is notably employed by NASA, which develops roadmaps and taxonomies to guide its priorities and investments in specific technical domains.1 Such documents identify, organize and prioritize the critical technologies needed to support future missions, thereby providing a coherent mapping of what developments and technological maturation sequences are required (even though, of course, a roadmap cannot anticipate political and policy upheavals).
Europe already has some analogous processes. Yet a more systematic integration of NASA-style approaches to technological road mapping – strongly linking roadmaps, technology classification and clear prioritization – could reinforce both the coherence and the impact of European efforts in the space sector.
The first few months of 2026 will give us an idea of what to take away from Europe’s autumn 2025 vision for strategic autonomy in space. Despite the encouraging signals, prudence remains essential, as the institutional and political harmony of European space activities is still at stake. The consolidation and implementation of the ambitions articulated in strategies and budgetary announcements do not circumvent the need for genuine reflection on the coordination of continental space policy and for careful attention to the actual follow-through. The high stakes at play are Europe’s strategic and ideological autonomy with regard to critical capabilities. While politics can accommodate rhetorical flourish, space technology never lies. Crises illuminate our dependencies, and it is precisely in their light that we are called to assert our independence.
Notes
1 Such as the latest NASA Technology Taxonomy 2024.↩
About the author
Alban Guyomarc'h is a researcher in space law and private international law at Paris-Panthéon Assas University and at Collège de France. He is also associate to the Chaire Espace of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, and an expert on the geopolitics of lunar exploration.